Replication data for: Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies

Chapters II-IV study transfers, debt, and monetary/wage policy-making and outcomes, stressing that participation enhances transfer-policy responsiveness to inequality and vice versa, that policy-making veto actors retard fiscal-policy adjustments, inducing greater long-run debt-responses to all other political-economic stimuli, and that monetary policy’s nominal and real effects depend, respectively, on the broader political-economic interest-structure and on wage-price bargainers’ sectorial composition and coordination.

Broadly, the book argues that these developments have exacerbated the distributional conflicts inherent in the policies to which postwar governments had committed while undermining their more-universally desired efficiency-fostering roles. Battles that once raged primarily over policies conducted within postwar-commitment frameworks now rage over the putative ‘reforms’ of the frameworks that will set the institutional rules within which democratic struggle over macroeconomic policy and free-market competition will continue. • Emphasizes theoretically the interaction of multiple political-economic institutions and interest-structures in shaping dynamic policies and outcomes and shows how to model such complexly interactive and dynamic propositions empirically and that the historical record strongly supports such specifications • Offers extensive substantive evaluation of technical empirical results complete with the many illuminating figures and tables required to interpret interactions and dynami cs • Finds very strong evidence of interesting electoral and partisan effects on strategic fiscal and monetary policies that challenges, amends, advances, and hopefully re-energizes ‘political business cycle’ theory and empirics.