Data · dataset · 2010
Paying-to-Play in Securities Class Actions: A Look at Lawyers' Campaign Contributions
Listed in Harvard Dataverse
Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) to reduce plaintiffs’ lawyers’ influence in securities fraud class actions.
Description
The PSLRA’s presumption that the class member with the largest financial interest would be named lead plaintiff was meant to place the class, instead of its lawyers, in charge of the litigation. Congress hoped that institutional investment funds, such as public pension funds, would serve as the new lead plaintiffs.
At first, it seemed that the PSLRA was successful at installing institutional investors as lead plaintiffs and reducing the power imbalance between class counsel and their clients. Today there are new fears that plaintiffs’ lawyers have co-opted securities class actions by paying-to-play. “Paying-to-play” describes the practice of lawyers making campaign contributions to public pension funds’ political leadership in order to gain favorable consideration by the funds for appointment as class counsel.
Read the rest (2 more)
Many reforms have been proposed and enacted in response to paying-to-play fears. Aside from a few anecdotal reports, however, no examination of campaign contributions from plaintiffs’ lawyers to elected officials exists in the legal literature. This Note presents the first comprehensive report on campaign contributions that serve as the basis for paying-to-play concerns.
My data suggest that law firms do indeed contribute to the investment funds that select them as class counsel, ruling out one possible response to paying-to-play fears, namely, that these contributions are not being made in the first place. This Note also provides guidance for future research, and in doing so, touches upon issues such as the reasons that firms donate and how funds make counsel-selection decisions.
Links
Where it is published
- Dataverse dataset page dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi%3A10.7910%2FDVN%2F1AQJD2 ↗
landing page · from Harvard Dataverse
- DOI doi.org/10.7910/dvn/1aqjd2 ↗
DOI / persistent id · from Harvard Dataverse
Catalogue records · 1
- Dataverse API dataverse.harvard.edu/api/datasets/:persistentId/?persistentId=doi%3A10.7910%2FDVN%2… ↗
metadata API · from Harvard Dataverse
Provenance · 1 source records, 6 field assertions
| Source | Key | Last seen | Raw |
|---|---|---|---|
| Harvard Dataverse | doi:10.7910/DVN/1AQJD2 | 11 d ago | JSON v1 |
| Field | Assertion | Extractor | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| created_date | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | |
| description | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | /description |
| publication_date | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | |
| title | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | /name |
| updated_date | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | |
| version_label | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 |