Data · dataset · 2009
Replication data for: Agenda Power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies: 1988 to 2000
Listed in Harvard Dataverse
We find strong evidence that governing coalitions in Italy exercise significant negative agenda powers.
Description
First, governing parties have a roll rate that is nearly zero, and their roll rate is lower than opposition parties’ roll rates, which average about 20% on all final passage votes. Second, we find that, controlling for distance from the floor median, opposition parties have higher roll rates than government parties.
These results strongly suggest that governing parties in Italy are able to control the legislative agenda to their benefit. We also document significantly higher opposition roll rates on decree-conversion bills and budget bills that on ordinary bills – consistent with our theoretical analysis of the differing procedures used in each case.
Links
Where it is published
- Dataverse dataset page dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi%3A10.7910%2FDVN%2FDFWCBA ↗
landing page · from Harvard Dataverse
- DOI doi.org/10.7910/dvn/dfwcba ↗
DOI / persistent id · from Harvard Dataverse
Catalogue records · 1
- Dataverse API dataverse.harvard.edu/api/datasets/:persistentId/?persistentId=doi%3A10.7910%2FDVN%2… ↗
metadata API · from Harvard Dataverse
Provenance · 1 source records, 6 field assertions
| Source | Key | Last seen | Raw |
|---|---|---|---|
| Harvard Dataverse | doi:10.7910/DVN/DFWCBA | 13 d ago | JSON v1 |
| Field | Assertion | Extractor | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| created_date | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | |
| description | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | /description |
| publication_date | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | |
| title | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | /name |
| updated_date | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | |
| version_label | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 |