Data · dataset · 2006
Management Agency, Product Characteristics and Incentive Contracting in Transport Infrastructure Privatization
Listed in Harvard Dataverse
This study codifies and relates critical executive incentive-contracting issue to the unique principal-agent circumstances generated from privatization of development-related transport infrastructure.
Description
It provides a framework for designing incentive contract. In the mathematical concept, an integrated multitask agency and common agency were modeled.
The outcome could be simplified as: the equilibrium with n principals is exactly as if there is just one hypothetical principal with an objective function that is the sum of all the separate principals’ objectives, but the agent\'s risk aversion is multiplied n-fold. Remember that the more risk averse the agent, the lower the power of the incentive scheme. Thus, the Nash equilibrium incentive scheme with n principals has, roughly speaking, only (1/n)-th the power of the second-best scheme that would be offered by one truly unified principal.
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With promotion of incentive competition among the Government and the Board the incentives can be more powerful than those in the second-best. In empirical explorations, evidences show first that when transport service consumers view the output of tasks as complementary, CEOs should be given lower-powered incentives from the Board and higher-powered incentives from the Government. Second, when uncertainty across tasks is highly correlated, CEOs should also be given lower powered incentives.
A positive relationship increases their risk and therefore their need for insurance. A negative relationship, in contrast, is a source of risk diversification. All of these predictions are confirmed by the empirical data.
Links
Where it is published
- Dataverse dataset page dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi%3A10.6141%2FTW-SRDA-E92024-1 ↗
landing page · from Harvard Dataverse
- DOI doi.org/10.6141/tw-srda-e92024-1 ↗
DOI / persistent id · from Harvard Dataverse
Catalogue records · 1
- Dataverse API dataverse.harvard.edu/api/datasets/:persistentId/?persistentId=doi%3A10.6141%2FTW-SR… ↗
metadata API · from Harvard Dataverse
Provenance · 1 source records, 5 field assertions
| Source | Key | Last seen | Raw |
|---|---|---|---|
| Harvard Dataverse | doi:10.6141/TW-SRDA-E92024-1 | 12 d ago | JSON v1 |
| Field | Assertion | Extractor | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| created_date | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | |
| description | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | /description |
| publication_date | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | |
| title | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | /name |
| updated_date | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 |