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Data · dataset · 2007

Replication data for: The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies, 2004

Listed in Harvard Dataverse

The US Congress has often sought to limit presidential influence over certain public policies by designing agencies that are insulated from presidential control.

Description

Whether or not insulated agencies persist over time has important consequences for presidential management. If those agencies that persist over time are also those that are the most immune from presidential direction, this has potentially fatal consequences for the president's ability to manage the executive branch.

Modern presidents will preside over a less and less manageable bureaucracy over time. This article explains why agencies insulated from presidential control are more durable than other agencies and shows that they have a significantly higher expected duration than other agencies. The conclusion is that modern American presidents preside over a bureaucracy that is increasingly insulated from their control.

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Where it is published

Catalogue records · 1
Provenance · 1 source records, 6 field assertions
SourceKeyLast seenRaw
Harvard Dataversedoi:10.7910/DVN/GNUNOZ11 d agoJSON v1
FieldAssertionExtractorEvidence
created_datesource · Harvard Dataverseconnector:dataverse@1.0.0
descriptionsource · Harvard Dataverseconnector:dataverse@1.0.0/description
publication_datesource · Harvard Dataverseconnector:dataverse@1.0.0
titlesource · Harvard Dataverseconnector:dataverse@1.0.0/name
updated_datesource · Harvard Dataverseconnector:dataverse@1.0.0
version_labelsource · Harvard Dataverseconnector:dataverse@1.0.0