Data · dataset · 2007
Replication data for: Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions
Listed in Harvard Dataverse
A theory of sanction duration that focuses on differences between democratic and nondemocratic states in the structure of leaders’ support coalitions is tested, using a hazard model to analyze a data set of 47 sanction events with 272 observations.
Description
Results show that leadership change strongly affects the duration of sanctions only in the case of nondemocratic states. Leadership change in democratic states is unrelated to the duration of sanctions; however, leadership change in nondemocratic sender and nondemocratic target states is strongly related to the ending of economic sanctions.
Links
Where it is published
- Dataverse dataset page dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi%3A10.7910%2FDVN%2FRB1USI ↗
landing page · from Harvard Dataverse
- DOI doi.org/10.7910/dvn/rb1usi ↗
DOI / persistent id · from Harvard Dataverse
Catalogue records · 1
- Dataverse API dataverse.harvard.edu/api/datasets/:persistentId/?persistentId=doi%3A10.7910%2FDVN%2… ↗
metadata API · from Harvard Dataverse
Provenance · 1 source records, 6 field assertions
| Source | Key | Last seen | Raw |
|---|---|---|---|
| Harvard Dataverse | doi:10.7910/DVN/RB1USI | 12 d ago | JSON v1 |
| Field | Assertion | Extractor | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| created_date | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | |
| description | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | /description |
| publication_date | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | |
| title | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | /name |
| updated_date | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 | |
| version_label | source · Harvard Dataverse | connector:dataverse@1.0.0 |