Competition, market structure, and government policy in Britain, 1945–70

Competition laws are introduced for the first time in this period, yet their effectiveness in fostering competition remains poorly understood, while economic challenges and concerns about relative performance led policymakers to intervene directly in the organization of industry. Existing research has largely focussed on Britain’s productivity and managerial weaknesses, but has paid less attention to how regulatory choices affecting market structure contributed to these outcomes.

This study addresses that gap by analysing how post-war competition policy—particularly the regulation of collusion and mergers—altered firms’ incentives and behaviour. Using newly digitized evidence at the product, firm, and industry levels, the thesis combines archival sources with econometric analysis. It examines the impact of the introduction of anti-cartel legislation in the cigarette market; evaluates the effects of government-sponsored mergers in the late 1960s on innovation and operating performance; and explores the broader link between market structure and innovation during the period through firm- and industry-level analyses.